A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient...
| Autores: | ; |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Estado: | Accepted version |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/150700 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700 |
| Nivel de acceso: | Acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics |
| _version_ | 1878738627819732992 |
|---|---|
| author | Atay, Ata |
| author2 | Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) |
| author2_role | author |
| author_browse | Atay, Ata Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) |
| author_facet | Atay, Ata Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) |
| author_role | author |
| collection | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| description | We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | ES_b237146d0ebf219960c8ca4a4a4cbc2d |
| institution | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| instname_str | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| network_acronym_str | ES |
| network_name_str | España |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:recercat.cat:2445/150700 |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Elsevier B.V. |
| publisherStr | Elsevier B.V. |
| reponame_str | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| spelling | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets Atay, Ata Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva) Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. Elsevier B.V. https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700 |
| spellingShingle | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets Atay, Ata Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics |
| status_str | acceptedVersion |
| title | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets |
| title_full | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets |
| title_fullStr | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets |
| title_full_unstemmed | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets |
| title_short | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets |
| title_sort | A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets |
| topic | Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics |
| topic_facet | Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700 |