A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Format: | Article |
| Status: | Accepted version |
| Publication date: | 2019 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repository: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/150700 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics |
| Summary: | We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. |
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