The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem

We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem.  The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a fo...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Hoefer, Carl; Viger,Christopher; Viger, Daniel
Tipo de documento: Artículo
Fecha de publicación:2019
País:España
Institución:Universidad del País Vasco
Repositorio:Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
OAI Identifier:oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/39739
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39739
Nivel de acceso:Acceso abierto
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author Hoefer, Carl
author2 Viger,Christopher
Viger, Daniel
author2_role author
author
author_browse Hoefer, Carl
Viger, Daniel
Viger,Christopher
author_facet Hoefer, Carl
Viger,Christopher
Viger, Daniel
author_role author
collection Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
description We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem.  The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken. 
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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institution Universidad del País Vasco
instname_str Universidad del País Vasco
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
oai_identifier_str oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/39739
publishDate 2019
publishDateSort 2019
publisher Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
publisherStr Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua
reponame_str Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
spelling The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem Hoefer, Carl Viger,Christopher Viger, Daniel We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem.  The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken.  Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatearen Argitalpen Zerbitzua http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39739
spellingShingle The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
Hoefer, Carl
title The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
title_full The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
title_fullStr The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
title_full_unstemmed The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
title_short The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
title_sort The philosopher’s paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
url http://hdl.handle.net/10810/39739