Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compar...
| Autores: | ; |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Estado: | Accepted version |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/39334 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2454/39334 |
| Nivel de acceso: | Acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Agenda Binary tree Elections Manipulation Sequential voting |
| _version_ | 1878740309374926848 |
|---|---|
| author | Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo |
| author2 | Dimitrov, Dinko |
| author2_role | author |
| author_browse | Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo Dimitrov, Dinko |
| author_facet | Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo Dimitrov, Dinko |
| author_role | author |
| collection | Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| description | We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | ES_d0c1cefdc31d09fb2b8c6c5368a854bc |
| institution | Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| instname_str | Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| network_acronym_str | ES |
| network_name_str | España |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:academica-e.unavarra.es:2454/39334 |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| publisherStr | Elsevier |
| reponame_str | Academica-e. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Pública de Navarra |
| spelling | Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo Dimitrov, Dinko Agenda Binary tree Elections Manipulation Sequential voting We consider a setting where it is known for an electorate what probability a given candidate has of beating another in a pairwise ballot. An agenda assigns candidates to the leaves of a binary tree and is called manipulative if it inverts the final winning probabilities for two candidates. We compare standard and symmetric agendas in four-candidate elections and show that in monotone environments the former are more manipulative. Elsevier https://hdl.handle.net/2454/39334 |
| spellingShingle | Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections Arlegi Pérez, Ricardo Agenda Binary tree Elections Manipulation Sequential voting |
| status_str | acceptedVersion |
| title | Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections |
| title_full | Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections |
| title_fullStr | Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections |
| title_full_unstemmed | Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections |
| title_short | Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections |
| title_sort | Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections |
| topic | Agenda Binary tree Elections Manipulation Sequential voting |
| topic_facet | Agenda Binary tree Elections Manipulation Sequential voting |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/2454/39334 |