The meaning of 'literal meaning'

Although references to literal meaning are frequent in the legal field, it is not easy to determine what "literal meaning" means. In general, it seems to be considered as unproblematic not only by many legal scholars but also by lawyers and other participants in the legal practice. In this...

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Author: Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
Format: Article
Status:Published version
Publication date:2018
Country:España
Institution:Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Repository:Repositorio Digital de la UPF
OAI Identifier:oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/72248
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72248
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:Literal meaning
Descriptivism
New theories of reference
Legal interpretation
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author Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
author_browse Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
author_facet Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
author_role author
collection Repositorio Digital de la UPF
description Although references to literal meaning are frequent in the legal field, it is not easy to determine what "literal meaning" means. In general, it seems to be considered as unproblematic not only by many legal scholars but also by lawyers and other participants in the legal practice. In this paper I will show that this position comes about because an intuitive view of language is assumed according to which words are related by competent speakers to descriptions that determine reference. However, this descriptivist approach is shown to be problematic in reconstructing our linguistic practices. In contrast, New Theories of Reference (NTR) provide a plausible account of our common and legal uses of words. In this paper I will present a version of NTR that avoids the criticisms that are normally addressed to them. I will also show that this version of NTR has advantages when compared to the traditional descriptivist model. In the legal field, this version of NTR allows us a better understanding of how legal interpretation works.
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spelling The meaning of 'literal meaning' Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena Literal meaning Descriptivism New theories of reference Legal interpretation Although references to literal meaning are frequent in the legal field, it is not easy to determine what "literal meaning" means. In general, it seems to be considered as unproblematic not only by many legal scholars but also by lawyers and other participants in the legal practice. In this paper I will show that this position comes about because an intuitive view of language is assumed according to which words are related by competent speakers to descriptions that determine reference. However, this descriptivist approach is shown to be problematic in reconstructing our linguistic practices. In contrast, New Theories of Reference (NTR) provide a plausible account of our common and legal uses of words. In this paper I will present a version of NTR that avoids the criticisms that are normally addressed to them. I will also show that this version of NTR has advantages when compared to the traditional descriptivist model. In the legal field, this version of NTR allows us a better understanding of how legal interpretation works. Edizioni ETS https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72248
spellingShingle The meaning of 'literal meaning'
Ramírez Ludeña, Lorena
Literal meaning
Descriptivism
New theories of reference
Legal interpretation
status_str publishedVersion
title The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_full The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_fullStr The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_full_unstemmed The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_short The meaning of 'literal meaning'
title_sort The meaning of 'literal meaning'
topic Literal meaning
Descriptivism
New theories of reference
Legal interpretation
topic_facet Literal meaning
Descriptivism
New theories of reference
Legal interpretation
url https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72248