Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ –...
| Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Status: | Accepted version |
| Publication date: | 2021 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/208370 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) |
| _version_ | 1878736594603606016 |
|---|---|
| author | García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author_browse | García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author_facet | García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author_role | author |
| collection | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| description | Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | ES_91c62dfcb04e4e15a70905ce3283facc |
| institution | Universidad de Barcelona |
| instname_str | Universidad de Barcelona |
| network_acronym_str | ES |
| network_name_str | España |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/208370 |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publishDateSort | 2021 |
| publisher | Oslo University Press |
| publisherStr | Oslo University Press |
| reponame_str | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| spelling | Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions García-Carpintero, Manuel Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense. Oslo University Press https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370 |
| spellingShingle | Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions García-Carpintero, Manuel Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) |
| status_str | acceptedVersion |
| title | Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_full | Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_fullStr | Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_short | Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| title_sort | Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions |
| topic | Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) |
| topic_facet | Representació (Filosofia) Proposició (Lògica) Representation (Philosophy) Proposition (Logic) |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370 |