Objective Chance: Not Propensity, Maybe Determinism
One currently popular view about the nature of objective probabilities, or objective chances, is that they - or some of them, at least - are primitive features of the physical world, not reducible to anything else nor explicable in terms of frequencies, degrees of belief, or anything else. In this p...
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| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Estado: | Published version |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/116252 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116252 |
| Nivel de acceso: | Acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofia de la ciència Determinisme (Filosofia) Física Metafísica Probabilitats Philosophy of science Determinism (Philosophy) Physics Metaphysics Probabilities |
| Sumario: | One currently popular view about the nature of objective probabilities, or objective chances, is that they - or some of them, at least - are primitive features of the physical world, not reducible to anything else nor explicable in terms of frequencies, degrees of belief, or anything else. In this paper I explore the question of what the semantic content of primitive chance claims could be. Every attempt I look at to supply such content either comes up empty-handed, or begs important questions against the skeptic who doubts the meaningfulness of primitive chance claims. In the second half of the paper I show that, by contrast, there are clear, and clearly contentful, ways to understand objective chance claims if we ground them on deterministic physical underpinnings. |
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