A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets
We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient...
| Autores: | ; |
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| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Estado: | Accepted version |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/150700 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150700 |
| Nivel de acceso: | Acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Assignació de recursos Competència econòmica Presa de decisions (Estadística) Matemàtica financera Resource allocation Competition Statistical decision Business mathematics |
| Sumario: | We analyze the extent to which two known results of the relationship between the core and the stable sets for two-sided assignment games can be extended to three-sided assignment games. We find that the dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set and, likewise, sufficient when each sector of the three-sided market has two agents. Unlike the two-sided case, the union of the extended cores of all the -compatible subgames with respect to an optimal matching may not be a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. |
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