The philosopher's paradox: How to make a coherent decision in the Newcomb Problem
We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a fol...
| Authors: | ; ; |
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| Format: | Article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication date: | 2019 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repository: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/166337 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/166337 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Presa de decisions Elecció (Psicologia) Raó Decision making Choice (Psychology) Reason Newcomb, William A. |
| Summary: | We offer a novel argument for one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem. The intentional states of a rational person are psychologically coherent across time, and rational decisions are made against this backdrop. We compare this coherence constraint with a golf swing, which to be effective must include a follow-through after the ball is in flight. Decisions, like golf swings, are extended processes, and their coherence with other psychological states of a player in the Newcomb scenario links her choice with the way she is predicted in a common cause structure. As a result, the standard argument for two-boxing is mistaken. |
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