Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be...
| Autores: | ; |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
| Estado: | Accepted version |
| Data de publicação: | 2016 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositório: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/108982 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982 |
| Nível de acesso: | Acesso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Frau fiscal Frau de llei Impostos sobre la renda Perspectiva Control de gestió Tax evasion Evasion of the law Income tax Perspective Management audit |
| Resumo: | Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are non-increasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT |
|---|