Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory

Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Piolatto, Amedeo; Trotin, Gwenola
Format: Article
Status:Accepted version
Publication date:2016
Country:España
Institution:Universidad de Barcelona
Repository:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/108982
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:Frau fiscal
Frau de llei
Impostos sobre la renda
Perspectiva
Control de gestió
Tax evasion
Evasion of the law
Income tax
Perspective
Management audit
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author Piolatto, Amedeo
author2 Trotin, Gwenola
author2_role author
author_browse Piolatto, Amedeo
Trotin, Gwenola
author_facet Piolatto, Amedeo
Trotin, Gwenola
author_role author
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
description Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are non-increasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
format article
id ES_0741eccb9c6733dfc9db9b69f4e8d8f4
institution Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
oai_identifier_str oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/108982
publishDate 2016
publishDateSort 2016
publisher Wiley
publisherStr Wiley
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
spelling Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory Piolatto, Amedeo Trotin, Gwenola Frau fiscal Frau de llei Impostos sobre la renda Perspectiva Control de gestió Tax evasion Evasion of the law Income tax Perspective Management audit Prospect Theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to Expected Utility Theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are non-increasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT Wiley https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982
spellingShingle Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
Piolatto, Amedeo
Frau fiscal
Frau de llei
Impostos sobre la renda
Perspectiva
Control de gestió
Tax evasion
Evasion of the law
Income tax
Perspective
Management audit
status_str acceptedVersion
title Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_full Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_fullStr Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_full_unstemmed Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_short Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
title_sort Optimal income tax enforcement under prospect theory
topic Frau fiscal
Frau de llei
Impostos sobre la renda
Perspectiva
Control de gestió
Tax evasion
Evasion of the law
Income tax
Perspective
Management audit
topic_facet Frau fiscal
Frau de llei
Impostos sobre la renda
Perspectiva
Control de gestió
Tax evasion
Evasion of the law
Income tax
Perspective
Management audit
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108982