As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional

The following pages are about Avicennas transformations of Aristotles De anima. This research was moved by the necessity of demonstrating the relation between Avicenna, an author belonging de Medieval Arabic tradition, and his most important source, i.e, Aristotle. One of the attitudes about the Ara...

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Author: Meline Costa Sousa
Format: Doctoral thesis
Status:Published version
Publication date:2016
Country:Brasil
Institution:UFMG
Repository:Repositório Institucional da UFMG
Language:Portuguese
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.ufmg.br:1843/BUOS-AQKRR3
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-AQKRR3
Access Level:Open access
Keyword:Filosofia
AristotelesDe anima
Avicena, 980-1037
Filosofia medieval
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author Meline Costa Sousa
author_browse Meline Costa Sousa
author_facet Meline Costa Sousa
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collection Repositório Institucional da UFMG
description The following pages are about Avicennas transformations of Aristotles De anima. This research was moved by the necessity of demonstrating the relation between Avicenna, an author belonging de Medieval Arabic tradition, and his most important source, i.e, Aristotle. One of the attitudes about the Arabic Philosophy from the 20th century considered it as philosophically insignificant for being an intermediary between Greek and Medieval Latin Philosophy. So, is there any kind of originality concerning the Arabic thought? Some scholars as Gutas, Druart, Taylor, Hasse, Kaukua, Adamson and Kukkonen have already worked on this question and have demonstrated the originality of the Arabic thinkers, especially Avicenna, if compared to the Greek thinkers. However, a lot of scholars still reduce some concepts and arguments used by Avicenna in his works to the content of his sources. There are two examples that illustrate this approach: the treatment of souls substantiality through the investigation of its definition (De anima II.1) and the investigation of the agent intellects ontological status (De anima III.5). In both situations Avicennas interpretation is reduced to the interpretations of other thinkers. In the first situation, Avicenna critics the souls definition as form of a natural body in favor of the soul as the perfection of a natural body. So, Avicenna understands the term perfection as its best definition. Some contemporary scholars associate Avicennas understanding to the argumentation found in Aristotles Theology. As I am going to defend, this attitude neglects Avicennas critics of both definitions of th human soul, since they are not able to demonstrate the souls substantiality.According to the second situation, the ontological status of the agent intellect in Avicennas theory is reduced to the interpretations of it from Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias works. For the three thinkers assume that Aristotles productive intellect in III.5, 430a10-25 is a separated substance, some scholars understood that the Arabictradition has adopted the transcendental status of the agent intellect without questioning. In view of that, the purpose of this investigation is to demonstrate the originality of Avicennas thought, if compared to his sources, from the analyze of his transformations of the mentioned passages.
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spelling As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional Meline Costa Sousa Filosofia AristotelesDe anima Avicena, 980-1037 Filosofia medieval The following pages are about Avicennas transformations of Aristotles De anima. This research was moved by the necessity of demonstrating the relation between Avicenna, an author belonging de Medieval Arabic tradition, and his most important source, i.e, Aristotle. One of the attitudes about the Arabic Philosophy from the 20th century considered it as philosophically insignificant for being an intermediary between Greek and Medieval Latin Philosophy. So, is there any kind of originality concerning the Arabic thought? Some scholars as Gutas, Druart, Taylor, Hasse, Kaukua, Adamson and Kukkonen have already worked on this question and have demonstrated the originality of the Arabic thinkers, especially Avicenna, if compared to the Greek thinkers. However, a lot of scholars still reduce some concepts and arguments used by Avicenna in his works to the content of his sources. There are two examples that illustrate this approach: the treatment of souls substantiality through the investigation of its definition (De anima II.1) and the investigation of the agent intellects ontological status (De anima III.5). In both situations Avicennas interpretation is reduced to the interpretations of other thinkers. In the first situation, Avicenna critics the souls definition as form of a natural body in favor of the soul as the perfection of a natural body. So, Avicenna understands the term perfection as its best definition. Some contemporary scholars associate Avicennas understanding to the argumentation found in Aristotles Theology. As I am going to defend, this attitude neglects Avicennas critics of both definitions of th human soul, since they are not able to demonstrate the souls substantiality.According to the second situation, the ontological status of the agent intellect in Avicennas theory is reduced to the interpretations of it from Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias works. For the three thinkers assume that Aristotles productive intellect in III.5, 430a10-25 is a separated substance, some scholars understood that the Arabictradition has adopted the transcendental status of the agent intellect without questioning. In view of that, the purpose of this investigation is to demonstrate the originality of Avicennas thought, if compared to his sources, from the analyze of his transformations of the mentioned passages. Esta tese é dedicada às transformações realizadas por Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles. A investigação proposta foi movida pela necessidade de demonstrar como se dá, de modo efetivo, a relação entre Avicena e uma das suas principais fontes, i.e., Aristóteles.Uma das linhas interpretativas a partir da qual a filosofia árabe foi abordada, ao longo do século XX, acusa a filosofia árabe de ser uma ponte entre a filosofia grega e a filosofia latina e, do ponto de vista da história da filosofia, a filosofia árabe seria filosoficamente insignificante; seria, antes, história das ideias. Haveria, assim, algum tipo de originalidade na filosofia árabe? Alguns estudiosos, tais como Gutas, Druart, Taylor, Hasse, Kaukua, Adamson, Kukkonen, dentre outros, já se dedicaram a esta questão, defendendo a originalidade dos filósofos árabes, especialmente Avicena, frente à tradição grega. No entanto, muitos estudiosos ainda reduzem certos conceitos e argumentos presentes na filosofia de Avicena ao conteúdo das suas fontes. São dois os exemplos que ilustram esta prática: o tratamento da substancialidade da alma através da busca pela sua definição (De anima II.1) e a interpretação do estatuto ontológico do intelecto agente (De anima III.5). Em ambos os casos, a interpretação aviceniana é reduzida à interpretação de outros autores. No primeiro caso, Avicena critica a definição de alma como forma do corpo em favor de ser "perfeição" um termo que melhor lhe convém. Alguns estudiosos contemporâneos identificam este posicionamento com a argumentação presente na Teologia de Aristóteles. Contudo, é negligenciado o fato de Avicena negar que ambas as definições falham na tentativa de explicitar a substancialidade da alma. No segundo caso, o estatuto ontológico atribuído, por Avicena, ao intelecto agente, é visto como tributário do estatuto ontológico conferido a ele por Alexandre de Afrodísia e Temístio. O fato dos três filósofos, igualmente, tomarem o intelecto mencionado por Aristóteles no De anima III.5, 430a10-25 (o intelecto produtivo) como uma substância separada, levou muitos estudiosos a assumir que os autores da tradição árabe adotaram a transcendência do intelecto agente sem questionamentos. Portanto, o objetivo da tese é, a partir da análise das transformações realizadas por Avicena das passagens mencionadas, demonstrar a originalidade do autor frente às suasfontes. Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais UFMG http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-AQKRR3
spellingShingle As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional
Meline Costa Sousa
Filosofia
AristotelesDe anima
Avicena, 980-1037
Filosofia medieval
status_str publishedVersion
title As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional
title_full As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional
title_fullStr As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional
title_full_unstemmed As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional
title_short As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional
title_sort As transformações de Avicena do De anima de Aristóteles: sobre a alma racional
topic Filosofia
AristotelesDe anima
Avicena, 980-1037
Filosofia medieval
topic_facet Filosofia
AristotelesDe anima
Avicena, 980-1037
Filosofia medieval
url http://hdl.handle.net/1843/BUOS-AQKRR3