Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers?
Mergers and acquisitions may change competition even when they do not affect market structure, a case known as con glomerate mergers. In this paper, we explore a wave of acqui sitions of higher education institutions by educational groups in Brazil, which allows us to disentangle the effects of con...
| Autores: | ; |
|---|---|
| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Estado: | Published version |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | INSPER |
| Repositorio: | Repositório Institucional da INSPER |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.insper.edu.br:11224/4082 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4082 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.06.001 |
| Nivel de acceso: | Acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Mergers and acquisitions conglomerate mergers multiunit firms higher education |
| _version_ | 1878760590318501888 |
|---|---|
| author | Garcia, Carolina Policarpo |
| author2 | PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO |
| author2_role | author |
| author_browse | Garcia, Carolina Policarpo PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO |
| author_facet | Garcia, Carolina Policarpo PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO |
| author_role | author |
| collection | Repositório Institucional da INSPER |
| description | Mergers and acquisitions may change competition even when they do not affect market structure, a case known as con glomerate mergers. In this paper, we explore a wave of acqui sitions of higher education institutions by educational groups in Brazil, which allows us to disentangle the effects of con glomerate mergers and of horizontal mergers on price, quan tity, and quality indicators. Our findings show that multiunit organizations are able to increase some quality indicators. As for the effect on price and quantity, results are different. For conglomerate mergers, we estimated an increase in the num ber of freshmen and tuition fees, whereas for acquisitions that lead to horizontal concentration there is no increase in quan tity, just in prices. Also these effects are larger the smaller the market share of the acquired HEI. On the whole, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that multiunit operations increase efficiency, but only conglomerate mergers tend to pass those gains on to consumers. Results also indicate that greater caution should be taken in market extension mergers when the acquired firm has a clear dominant position. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | BR_98a0489fdf8758d0f8e6e97eff76885f |
| institution | INSPER |
| instname_str | Instituição de Ensino Superior e de Pesquisa (INSPER) |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | BR |
| network_name_str | Brasil |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:repositorio.insper.edu.br:11224/4082 |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| publisherStr | Elsevier |
| reponame_str | Repositório Institucional da INSPER |
| spelling | Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers? Garcia, Carolina Policarpo PAULO FURQUIM DE AZEVEDO Mergers and acquisitions conglomerate mergers multiunit firms higher education Mergers and acquisitions may change competition even when they do not affect market structure, a case known as con glomerate mergers. In this paper, we explore a wave of acqui sitions of higher education institutions by educational groups in Brazil, which allows us to disentangle the effects of con glomerate mergers and of horizontal mergers on price, quan tity, and quality indicators. Our findings show that multiunit organizations are able to increase some quality indicators. As for the effect on price and quantity, results are different. For conglomerate mergers, we estimated an increase in the num ber of freshmen and tuition fees, whereas for acquisitions that lead to horizontal concentration there is no increase in quan tity, just in prices. Also these effects are larger the smaller the market share of the acquired HEI. On the whole, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that multiunit operations increase efficiency, but only conglomerate mergers tend to pass those gains on to consumers. Results also indicate that greater caution should be taken in market extension mergers when the acquired firm has a clear dominant position. Texto completo Elsevier 1677187 https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4082 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.06.001 66 |
| spellingShingle | Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers? Garcia, Carolina Policarpo Mergers and acquisitions conglomerate mergers multiunit firms higher education |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers? |
| title_full | Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers? |
| title_fullStr | Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers? |
| title_short | Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers? |
| title_sort | Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers? |
| topic | Mergers and acquisitions conglomerate mergers multiunit firms higher education |
| topic_facet | Mergers and acquisitions conglomerate mergers multiunit firms higher education |
| url | https://repositorio.insper.edu.br/handle/11224/4082 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.06.001 |